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This is an evaluation of the methodology used by the Air Force in determining the 
military value of the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station and in estimating the potential 
costs savings generated by its proposed closing. 
 
Loss of Future Mission Capability 
 
Our findings show that if the Air Force closes the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station, it 
would lose a highly effective mission ready fighter wing, which could take up to five 
years to rebuild.  The 110th fighter wing earned the best average Fully Mission Capable 
(FMC) rate of the six A-10 bases during the past 10 years. Its crews have logged more 
flight hours than any other A-10 unit in the last eight years (Appendix B, Slides 25 - 26).   
 
The proposed closure of the 110th Fighter Wing and movement of the A-10 aircraft to 
Selfridge will cause the new A-10 squadron to “drop to the lowest combat ready status 
and be a non-deployable unit for at least 3 to 5 years, depending on the availability of 
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training school assets” according to the sworn testimony of Retired Major General E. 
Gordon Stump (June 20, 2005).   Selfridge’s F-16 pilots will be given first priority on 
placement and assignment for the A-10s, making it very likely that only a few of the 





The methodology used by the Air Force in determining the military value of the W.K. 
Kellogg Air Guard Station is highly subjective, undocumented, and, at the same time, 
partially based on incorrect and irrelevant data. 
    
The final military value rankings of bases are only partially derived from the bases’ 
Mission Capabilities Index (MCI).  A regression analysis using data from 80 Air Forces 
bases shows that the MCIs for the eight separate missions account for only 61 percent of 
the variation in assigned military values of the bases.1 Of the eight MCIs, only the 
bomber and space operation’s MCIs were found to be statistically significant in 
explaining a base’s military value.    
 
In addition, the information collected in the WIDGET data gathering process contains 
errors that negatively impact the calculated MCIs for the W.K. Kellogg AGS.  More 
disturbingly, much of data gathered in the WIDGET process in not relevant in 
determining the mission capability of the W.K. Kellogg AGS.  For example, 
 
• The Prevailing Installation Weather Conditions (formula 1271) score for the W.K. 
Kellogg AGS was inappropriate.  The criteria, a 3000 feet ceiling and 3 miles 
visibility, is not relevant when the standard conditions for flight is 300 feet and 1 
mile. 
• The Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission (formula 1245) was erroneously 
based on distance and not on the number of mission airspaces available and useful 
for effective training.  Pilots flying out of W.K. Kellogg AGS can and do use up 
to nine airspaces which offer a variety of surface environments and, due its 
northern location, seasonally variation as well including three Air-to-Surface 
ranges, two of which allow Live Munitions and Laser Guided Bombs (LGB) 
(Appendix B, Slides 37-38). 
• The Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Missions (formula 1246) is not 
required for low altitude tactical training fighter aircraft, particularly in the A-10. 
• The MCI for SOF/CSAR including A-10s is based, in part, on base capabilities 
that do not relate to the operation of A-10s including landing zones for helicopters 
and drop zones for parachutists, which are available to W.K. Kellogg at the 
adjacent Fort Custer military complex, but were not scored. 
                                                 
1This analysis is limited by our inability to obtain, after repeated tries, the complete 
listing of the Air Force’s military value scores for all of its bases.  
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• The question on Ramp Area and Serviceability (Formula 8) is unnecessarily 
biased toward large bases (configured on an Active Duty model), for it does not 
allow for joint ramp area agreements between the base and neighboring uses.  In 
fact, joint ramp agreements can be a cost-effective means for the Air Force to 
control costs while maintaining necessary surge potential. 
 
In short, the methodology used in determining the military value of W.K. Kellogg AGS 
was highly subjective and based on incorrect and inappropriate data. Of course, it is well 
beyond the scope of this analysis to come up with an alternative methodology to 
determine the military value of the W.K. Kellogg AGS.  However, these results do 
support the recommendation that the BRAC Commission broadens its scope of review to 
include the base’s past record of performance (including recruitment), age and condition 
of the base’s physical infrastructure, and its cost effectiveness. 
 
  
Potential Cost-Savings Estimates 
 
The Air Force seriously overestimated the potential cost savings generated by closing the 
W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station in Battle Creek Michigan.  The Air Force estimates that 
the Net Present Value (NPV) of cost savings over the next 20 years from closing the base 
will reach $167 million.  Moreover, its analysis shows that the annual recurring savings 
after the closing are $12.7 million with an immediate payback expected. It is our 
estimate that it will cost the Air Force $6.144 million (NPV) to close the W.K. 
Kellogg Air Guard Station.   
 
The Air Force’s calculations are incorrect for four major reasons: 
 
1. It failed to account for the substantial retraining costs that will occur if the 110th 
Fighter Wing is moved to Selfridge.  Based on the assumption that the wing 
would lose 50 percent of its current pilots during the move, it would cost more 
than $72 million and up to five years to retrain 18 F-16 fighter pilots to the same 
level as now maintained by today’s 110th Fighter Wing (Appendix B, Slides 72 - 
73). 
  
2. Its calculated cost saving for military personnel reduction – the elimination of 50 
positions – is voided by the fact that its overall end-strength remains unchanged.  
An issue recently addressed by a recent Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report entitled Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 
Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments (GAO)-05-785). 
 
3. It inflated the potential cost savings that will be generated by eliminating the 
overhead costs of the W.K. Kellogg airbase.  Current expenditure for base 
operation and maintenance is $4.2 million annually, not $5.7 million as reported 
in the COBRA model. 
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4. It ignored the cost of renovating Selfridge’s hangars which were constructed in 




The U.S. Air Force recommends that the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station be closed, the 
110th Fighter Wing deactivated and the A-10 aircraft be relocated to Selfridge. This 
report examines and evaluates the methodology used by the Air Force in determining the 
military value of the Kellogg base and in estimating the expected cost savings of closing 
the base.  In addition, this report examines the potential loss of the Air Force’s future 
mission capability if the Kellogg base is closed. 
 
It is the conclusion of this report that closing the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard Station is not 
in the best interest to our national defense.  We find that closing the base will lead to a 
loss of future mission capability.  Furthermore, the military value determination of the 
installation was based on a highly subjective and flawed methodology.  Finally, we 
estimated that closing the base will not generate any cost savings to the Air Force.  In 
fact, closing the base will cost the Air Force $6.144 million (NPV) during the next 20 
years. 
 
Loss of Future Mission Capability 
 
The closure of the Kellogg Air Guard and the resulting relocation of it’s A-10 aircraft to 
Selfridge would likely cause the unit to drop “to the lowest combat ready status and be a 
non-deployable unit for at least three to five years, depending on the availability of 
training school assets” according to the sworn testimony of Retired Major General E. 
Gordon Stump (June 20, 2005).   It is very likely that most of the unit’s current pilots 
would not be relocated with the planes to Selfridge because of both voluntary 
resignations and Selfridge’s current F-16 pilots enacting their right to pilot the relocated 
A-10s.    
  
The performance of the 110th Fighter Wing based at the W.K. Kellogg Air Guard has 
been highly honored.  It is the only ANG A-10 unit to receive an “outstanding” rating on 
an Air Combat Command (ACC) operational readiness inspection in the last nine years.   
Moreover, it is the only ANG A-10 unit with zero Class A or B mishaps since 1995.  In 
addition, it holds the top average “Fully Mission Capable” (FMC) rate for A-10 aircraft 
out of all ANG A-10 units for last ten years and its pilots have flown more hours, regular 
and combat, than any other ANG A-10 unit over the last eight years (Appendix B, Slides 
23-26). 
 
The unit’s maintenance personnel have more than 1,000 years of combined A-10 
experience with the average maintainers holding 11years of experience with the plane 
(Appendix B, Slide 25).  
 
Table 2 lists the unit’s most recent combat missions.  In 2003, the 110th Fighter Wing 
served in Operation Iraqi Freedom after returning from being deployed in Operation 
Southern Watch only three weeks earlier.  It was the only ANG unit to achieve such a 
feat.  In Operation Iraqi Freedom the unit flew 455 combat sorties, logging in more than 
1,164 combat hours  
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Flown in last 
8 years. 
Kellogg  110th 72.8%  34,773
Baltimore 175th 68.2%  31,546
Willow Grove 111th 67.3%  31,772
Bradley 103rd 59.9%  31,355
Boise 124th 69.8%  33,900
Barnes 104th 63.9%  34,643




Year Combat Mission Location
1995 Operation Deny Flight Bosnia
1997 Operation Joint Endeavor Bosnia
1999 Operation Noble Anvil Kosovo
2000 Operation Southern Watch Iraq
2002 Operation Southern Watch Iraq
2002 Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan
2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom Iraq
Table 2 - 110th Fighter Wing Combat Missions
 
 
In the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Wing personnel earned 14 Distinguished Flying 
Crosses and 10 Bronze Stars (Appendix B, Slide 24). 
 
Overall, Battle Creek’s overall MCI was better than 4 out of the 5 other ANG A-10 units 
(Table 3). It scored better than four of the five other ANG A-10 bases on 5 of 8 missions.  
According to these measures, Battle Creek is better suited to meet the Air Force’s future 
capability needs than four of the other five other ANG A-10 bases. 
 
BASE
    SOF/     
CSAR FIGHTER BOMBER AIRLIFT TANKER C2ISR UAV SPACE
AVERAGE 
MCI
Boise 41.35 50.86 39.70 47.32 70.84 72.76 73.07 43.37 54.91
Battle Creek 30.52 37.60 27.47 39.22 50.93 62.74 63.36 53.29 45.64
Willow Grove 37.71 49.69 35.58 35.85 40.94 47.95 60.56 11.62 39.99
Barnes 35.50 42.02 29.69 37.75 39.35 46.06 61.49 23.61 39.43
Baltimore 39.45 51.42 43.55 30.37 32.26 36.39 55.54 19.75 38.59
Bradley 35.40 40.10 27.43 37.83 40.49 51.78 54.51 12.77 37.54




In short, the Air Force will throw away years of experience and know-how if it closes the 
110th Fighter Wing and relocates the A-10 aircraft to Selfridge.  Not only will it take 
three or five years to rebuild the A-10 squadron to an acceptable level of combat 
readiness, but will cost millions of dollars as well as will be shown below.    
 
 
Determination of Military Value 
 
To assist in determining the military value of its installations, the Air Force used a Web-
based Installation Data Gathering and Entry Tool (WIDGET).  WIDGET provided the 
means to acquire a consistent data base for 154 installations, which was then used to 
calculate the Mission Capability Indexes (MCIs) for eight separate missions for each 
base.  The eight missions are fighter; bomber; tanker; airlift; Special Operations/Combat 
search and rescue (including A-10s); Command, Control, Intelligence/Surveillance/ 
Reconnaissance (C2ISR), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and space operations.  The 
MCI tool measures the specific military value for each base for all eight of the missions.  
It is important to note that each of installations was given a MCI score for each of these 
missions even if it never performed one or more of them. 
 
Armed with the calculated MCIs, the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) 
determined the military value of each base.  How these military values were derived is 
unclear, however.  After reviewing its 20 year force structure projections and overall 
principles, the BCEG went through several iterations of different base structures until “a 
set of potential forces structure deployments was reached that conformed to the Air Force 
principles, did not violate any Air Force imperatives, improved military capability and 
efficiency and was consistent with sound military judgment.”2 Based on this “potential 
force structure deployment” the BCEG adopted a set of recommended base closures and 
realignments.  This step also went through several iterations. “Lastly, the BCEG 
approved Air Force candidate recommendations were time-phased to balance maximized 
payback and minimized disruption to operational training units.”3 
 
During this decision making process, the final military value assigned to each of the 154 
installations became removed from the installations’ MCIs scores.  In other words, the 
determination of military value became more subjective. 
 
To estimate the importance of the data-intensive MCI process in determining the final 
military value assigned to each base, we conducted a regression analysis which 
statistically estimates the linear relationship between a base’s eight MCI scores and its 
final military value. Unfortunately, the analysis is based on only the 80 bases for which 
the military values were provided in the Department of the Air Force Analysis and 
Recommendations BRAC 2005 (Volume, Part 1 of 2).  We were not successful in 
obtaining the assigned military value for all bases.  The data used in this analysis is 
presented in Appendix A.  
 
                                                 
2 Department of the Air Force, Analysis and Recommendations BRAC 2005 (Volume, Part 1 of 2), page 52. 
3 Ibid, page 52. 
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As shown by the Adjusted R-squared Statistic on Table 4, the eight MCIs combined 
explain 61 percent of the variation in the military values of the 80 bases in the sample.  
Had the military value been calculated as some type of weighted average of the eight 
MCIs, then the Adjusted R-squared statistic would have been 1.   In other words, 
approximately 40 percent of the bases’ military value cannot be explained by its eight 
MCI scores.  Regarding the individual MCIs, the Bomber and Space Operations MCIs 
are statistically significant and have the correct sign.  For example, a one unit change in a 
base’s Bomber MCI would, on average lower its military value (improve its ranking) by 
nearly 1.8 units.  Surprisingly, a higher score in a base’s UAV MCI would have, on 
average, a negative impact on its military value – pushing it higher.   Statistically 
speaking, changes in a base’s Fighter, SOF/CSAR, Tanker or CS2ISR MCIs would have 
an impact on its military value that could not be distinguished from zero. 
 
The Beta statistics indicate the relative importance of each of the MCI values to 
explaining a change in the military value rating.  For example, a one standard deviation 
change in a base’s Bombers MCI will lead to a 0.58 standard deviation decline in the 
base’s military value rating. 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  Military Value Rating
Number of observations: 80
Adjusted R-Square:  0.61
MCI Value Coefficient t-statistics Beta
Fighter -0.99 -1.33 -0.31
SOF 0.07 0.16 0.02
Bomber -1.79 -2.76* -0.58
Tanker 0.18 0.21 0.07
Airlift -0.86 -1.52 -0.26
CS21SR -0.08 -0.08 -0.03
UAV 1.57 2.66* 0.51
Space Operations -0.53 -3.79* -0.30
Constant 145.39 9.20
Statistically significant at the 5 % level.





Errors in Calculating Mission Capability Indexes 
 
Although, the above analysis shows that a base’s final military value is only partially 
determined by its Mission Capability Indexes (MCIs), it is still important to evaluate the 
accuracy of the MCI methodology in capturing a base’s mission capability.   
 
In the following analyses, the MCI scores for the W.K. Kellogg AGS are compared to 
those of Selfridge and the five other ANG A-10 bases.  Table 5 shows the MCI scores for 
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the six comparison bases and the W.K Kellogg AGS, ranked in terms of the overall 
average MCI for all eight mission areas.  W.K. Kellogg ranks third behind Boise and 
Selfridge.   W.K. Kellogg’s average MCI score is only 3 percent below that of Selfridge, 
or 1.44 points.  This is in sharp contrast to the major difference in the two bases’ final 
military values – 62 for Selfridge compared to 122 for Kellogg.  Clearly, unarticulated 
subjective factors were added to Selfridge’s score to push its military value ranking so 
low. 
 
BASE SOF/CSAR FIGHTER BOMBER AIRLIFT TANKER C2ISR UAV SPACE
 AVERAGE 
MCI
Boise 41.35 50.86 39.7 47.32 70.84 72.76 73.07 43.37 54.91
Selfridge 42.06 48.07 33.86 47.27 58.24 63.74 62.07 21.35 47.08
Kellogg 30.52 37.6 27.47 39.22 50.93 62.74 63.36 53.29 45.64
Willow 
Grove 37.71 49.69 35.58 35.85 40.94 47.95 60.56 11.62 39.99
Barnes 35.5 42.02 29.69 37.75 39.35 46.06 61.49 23.61 39.43
Martin 
State 39.45 51.42 43.55 30.37 32.26 36.39 55.54 19.75 38.59
Bradley 35.4 40.1 27.43 37.83 40.49 51.78 54.51 12.77 37.54
Table 5  Overall MCI by Mission Area
 
 
In addition, several of the questions used in WIDGET to assess the military capability of 
W.K. Kellogg to conduct SOF/CSAR and Fighter missions are irrelevant to the operation 
of A-10s or do not adequately address the issue they are intended to measure. 
 
First, 22.7 percent of the total SOF/CSAR score rests on the base’s proximity to Landing 
Zones (necessary for helicopters) and Drop Zones (parachutes) – formulas 1248 and 
1249.  These do not apply to A-10 operations and should not be factored into MCI for A-
10 operations, further, these facilities are available through the adjacent Fort Custer 
military complex, but were not included in the score. 
 
In regards to methodology used to determine a base’s Fighters MCI, 22.08 percent of the 
total potential score depends on “The Proximity to Airspace Supporting Mission” – 
formula 1245.  For the SOF/CSAR MCI a slightly modified question – distance is 
slightly reduced – accounts for 14.72 percent of the total potential score.  These questions 
are ineffective in obtaining the information required for they only address distance to the 
airspace; they do not address the more important questions of how many airspace options 
does the base have and what is the variety of surface environments they offer.  Fighters 
cover 5 miles per minute so to set the maximum distance at 150 miles is far too 
restrictive.   The W.K. Kellogg Air Base offers nine different airspaces with a variety of 
environments within one hour fly time.  In addition, the Kellogg Air Base was not 
allowed to list the Grayling Range as an asset as it was assigned to Selfridge even though 
pilots from both bases have equal access and it is supported by the W.K. Kellogg ANGB. 
 
Regarding Ramp Area and Serviceability, the WIDGET question was heavily biased 
toward larger bases by not allowing for readily available shared ramp space to be 
counted.   For smaller bases like W.K. Kellogg, that have successfully executed surge 
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activities, this is an unfair requirement and is not cost effective.   W.K. Kellogg controls 
66,000 square yards of ramp area; however, it has ready access to other 90,000 square 
yards if required.  One of the clear advantages of shared ramp space, which can be 
secured by signed agreement in times of surge activity, is that the Air Force avoids 
maintenance and service costs. 
 
Finally, the WIDGET questions do not adequately address the growing concern of 
mission encroachment.  Noise migration procedures and congested air travel control 
environments can harm a base’s ability to perform surge operations.  This is strong 
advantage of the W.K. Kellogg base compare to other bases in urban setting (Appendix 
B, Slides 50 - 65).   
 
The questions in WIDGET never established the fact that the average age of the facilities 
at Kellogg is only 16 years old with 80 percent being built after 1991.  The base is on a 
10,000 foot runway, which is an alternate shuttle landing site and is utilized by Air Force 
One.  The base has the largest most modern munitions storage facility in southwest 
Michigan.  Finally, the base has room to grow with over 41,000 square foot available in 
authorized square footage for new facilities and over 45 acres available for building 
(Appendix B, Slides 35-37). 
 
In summary, the methodology used by the Air Force to determine the military value of 
the W.K. Kellogg AGS is unclear, subjective, and based, in part, on erroneous data.   
 
 
Evaluation of the Air Force’s Cost-Savings Estimates    
 
The Air Force used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model to estimate 
the cost savings associated with curtailing operations at the W.K. Kellogg AGS. The 
COBRA model is a standard cost-benefit model which simply compares the cost 
associated with closing or realigning a military facility (e.g. moving costs and 
environment cost) with its potential savings (e.g. reduction in personnel costs and 
overhead).  The model estimates the Net Present Value for a 20-year planning period.  In 
short, the COBRA model is an accounting tool and its results are only as good as its 
inputs. We have independently tested the model’s calculations and found them to be 
without error. 
 
Table 6 presents the Air Force COBRA model’s derived cost saving estimates.  The 
COBRA model estimates that the Air Force will incur a one-time cost of $8.3 million to 
close W.K. Kellogg AGS and will save $12.7 million annually during the implementation 
period – 2006 to 2011.  Moreover, the Net Present Value (NPV) of the cost savings 
derived from closing the base reaches $166.8 million during the 20-year planning period. 
 
The Air Force analysis carefully calculated the one-time costs of moving 182 employees 
from W.K. Kellogg to Selfridge, $4,945,000.  The assumptions and methodology used in 
these calculations appear sound. 
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Nearly 55 percent of the estimated annual savings of the closing the W.K. Kellogg is 
derived from the elimination of 92 personnel positions.  Of the 274 positions currently at 
the W.K. Kellogg Base only 182 are scheduled to be moved to Selfridge. 
 
(in thousands of $)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Beyond
Costs
Military Construction $25 $284 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Personnel $0 $2,103 $855 $855 $855 $855 $855
Overhead $441 $616 $593 $285 $285 $285 $285
Moving $0 $4,945
Mission $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Other $368 $318 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total $834 $8,266 $1,448 $1,140 $1,140 $1,140 $1,140
Savings
Military Construction $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Personnel $0 $4,007 $7,635 $7,635 $7,635 $7,635 $7,635
Overhead $936 $1,239 $5,985 $5,985 $5,985 $5,985 $6,230
Moving $0 $36 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mission $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Other $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total $936 $5,282 $13,620 $13,620 $13,620 $13,620 $13,865
Cost - Savings -$102 $2,984 -$12,172 -$12,480 -$12,480 -$12,480 -$12,725
NPV -$101 $2,862 -$11,359 -$11,330 -$11,021 -$10,721 -$7,426
rate 1.4% 2.1% 2.3% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.7%
Net Present Value: -$166,849




Retraining Costs of Pilots and Maintenance Personnel 
 
As discussed above, the proposed relocation of the A-10 aircraft (the 110th Fighter Wing 
will be closed) to Selfridge will cause the A-10 squadron to drop to a non-combat ready 
status and become a non-deployable unit for as long as five years.  Selfridge’s F-16 pilots 
will be given first priority on placement and assignment for the A-10s, making it very 
likely that only a few of the current A-10 pilots will make the move.  In addition, since 
the move is greater than 50 miles, the 110th Fighter Wing pilots have the right to refuse to 
move.  This will require the Air Force to spend million of dollars in extra training costs, 
as well as paying for the hundreds of hours of necessary flying time that it will take for 
the retrained pilots to achieve mission readiness. 
 
The Air Force cost-savings estimates simply ignored these substantial retraining costs.  In 
our calculations we make the conservative assumption that one-half of W.K. Kellogg’s 
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pilots will not make the move.  As shown in Table 7, the first year of training costs would 
total more than $27 million as 14 pilots take the TX (Transition) course at either Davis-
Monthan or Barksdale Air Force base, and that other four take the even more intensive B 
(Basic) courses.   After this training, the new pilots will still have to log in the required 
five years of flying time to gain a combat readiness level equaling approximately 50 
percent of the current unit’s training and combat experience level for the A-10 mission. 
 
Moreover, our estimates do not account for the retraining costs that will be necessary for 
ground personnel at Selfridge, including aircraft mechanics and munitions specialists.   
 
Assumption: 18 pilots will have to be retrained.




Cost of necessary flying to achieve combat readiness:
$8,046 $8,046 $8,046 $8,046 $8,046
$864 $864 $864 $864 $864
Total (in millions) $27,460 $8,910 $8,910 $8,910 $8,910 $8,910
5 years of required A-10 flying to 
Table 7 - Retraining Costs
14 TX courses @ $990,000 each
4 B courses @ $3,400,000 each
5 years of required A-10 flying 
 
 
In total, the military will be burdened with more than $72 million in retraining costs (not 
discounted) before for A-10 squadron returns to approximately 50 percent of the combat 
readiness it currently holds at the W.K. Kellogg AGS. 
 
 
Military Personnel Costs 
 
The Air Force erroneously claims that the elimination of 50 military positions at the 
Kellogg AGS would generate a cost savings of $4.8 million annually.  However, these 
should not be taken as cost savings, but instead, personnel cost transfers as the Air 
Force’s end military personnel strength does not change during the BRAC restructuring. 
As summarizes by the General Accountability Office (GAO):  
 
The Air Force was unable to provide us documentation showing at the 
present time to what extent each of these [eliminated] positions will be 
required to support future missions.  According to Air Force officials, they 
envision that most active slots will be needed for formal training and all 
the Air Reserve and Air National Guard personnel will be assigned to 
stressed career fields and emerging missions.  Furthermore, Air Force 
officials said that positions will also be revised during the Quadrennial 
Defense Review, which could decrease end strength. Either way, claiming 
such personnel as BRAC savings with reducing end strength does not 
provide dollar savings that can be reapplied outside personnel accounts 
and could result in the Air Force having to find other sources of funding 
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for up-front investment costs needed to implement its BRAC 
recommendations.4 
 
In short, the $4.8 millions generated by the elimination of the 50 military personnel 
positions will be used by the Air Force to fund necessary personnel slots required to 
retain military readiness in the face of its planned base closures and realignments.  These 
funds will not be “saved” nor invested in other future Air Force activities. 
 
We do accept the Air Force’s estimated annual cost savings of $2.8 million associated 
with the elimination of the 42 civilian positions at Kellogg if it is closed. 
 
 
Cost of Overhead – Operations and Maintenance 
 
The Air Force over estimated the cost savings that will be derived from the elimination of 
W.K. Kellogg AGS.  As shown in Table 8, we estimate that annual cost savings that 
would be gained by closing Kellogg would be $4.2 million, not the $5.7 million as 
promised by the Air Force.5  The largest cost savings will be the elimination of the fire 












Total Annual Savings: $4,217,411
Table 8                              
Operation and Maintenance Savings of 





Base Construction Costs at Selfridge to House the A-10s 
 
Additional military construction expenditures will be incurred to bed-down the 110FW at 
Selfridge.  These added costs are on top of the Air Force’s plans to construct a new Fire 
and Rescue Station at Selfridge. First, a new structure will be required to house the A-10 
                                                 
4Government Accountability Office, Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for 
Base Closures and Realignments (GAO)-05-785), July 2005, pg124. 
  
5 In an earlier version of our analysis (released on June 27), we seriously underestimated the potential cost 
savings associated with closing the base, $707,000 annually.  We regret and apologize for this error.   
 14
flight simulators.  In addition, there will be the added construction costs associated with 
building new fences for force protection due to the closing of the U.S. Army Garrison at 
Selfridge (Appendix B, Slide 45).  
 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 9, four of the current structures at Selfridge were 
constructed in 1932, while another seven were built in the 1950s and 1960s. Such old 
structures require added maintenance and operating costs and several may require to be 
replaced in the near future.  Many of the newer structures on the base are located on its 
West Ramp and are in excess of the base missions. 
 
We estimate that the Air Force will be required to make renovations to its 1932 and 1955 
Hangar space (structures 3 and 36) which will total $14.2 million.6   Additional required 
renovation costs on the base’s structures including its Fuel System Maintenance Dock, 
which is incompatible to A-10 aircraft, could reach up to $15 million; however, these 
were not included in our analysis. In addition, a new A-10 Simulator Facility will have to 







3 Hangar 1932 26,880
5 Weapons Release 1932 33,535
7 Aircraft Maintenance 1932 32,890
9 Deployment Processing 1932 34,243
36 Hangar 1955 62,983
154 Fuel System Maintenance 1991 17,000
35 Fuel System Maintenance 1999 30,171
Note: Existing aircraft related faciliteis would be in excess to the new
mission.  The lost square footage is 244,017 square feet.
Table 9 Age of Structures at Selfridge
 
 
In comparison, the average age of the facilities at Kellogg is 16 years, with 80 percent of 
the structures constructed after 1991.   
 
Revised Cost-Saving Estimate 
 
Table 10 presents our revised cost saving estimates.  The re-estimation includes 1)the 
necessary retraining costs that can be expected in moving the A-10 aircraft to Selfridge, 
2)the elimination of the erroneous military personnel savings, 3)the correction in the 
expected overhead cost saving and 4)the cost of renovating required hanger space at 
Selfridge. We find that the NPV of the costs to the Air Force of closing the W.K. Kellong 
ANG is $6,144 million. 
 
                                                 
6 Renovation construction costs are estimate to be $158.35 per square foot with 89,863 square feet of 
hangar space being renovated. 
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Costs at Selfridge
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Beyond
Military Construction $25 $14,514 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Personnel $0 $28,315 $8,950 $8,950 $8,950 $8,950 $8,950 $855
    Civilian $0 $728 $728 $728 $728 $728 $728 $728
    Mil. Housing All. $0 $127 $127 $127 $127 $127 $127 $127
    Retraining costs $0 $27,460 $8,910 $8,910 $8,910 $8,910 $8,910 $0
Overhead $0 $285 $285 $285 $285 $285 $285 $285
Other $368 $375 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   HAP/RSE $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Environmental $218 $240 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Misn Contract $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   1-time cost $150 $78 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Mothball $0 $57 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total Costs Selfridge $393 $43,489 $10,050 $10,050 $10,050 $10,050 $10,050 $1,140
Costs at Kellogg
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Military Construction $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Personnel $0 $938 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Civ. RIF $0 $746 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Civ Retire $0 $192 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Moving $0 $4,915 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Civilian $0 $4,546 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Freight $0 $271 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Unemployment $0 $58 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Military $0 $40 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Other $441 $614 $308 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Info Tech $0 $31 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Prog Manage $441 $331 $248 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Mothball $0 $0 $60 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
   Elim PCS $0 $252 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total Costs Kellogg $441 $6,467 $308 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Savings at Kellogg
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Military Construction $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Personnel $0 $1,396 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793
   Civilian $0 $1,396 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793 $2,793
   Military $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Overhead $936 $1,239 $4,217 $4,217 $4,217 $4,217 $4,217 $4,217
Other $0 $36 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Moving $0 $36 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Mission $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Other $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total Savings Kellogg $936 $2,707 $7,010 $7,010 $7,010 $7,010 $7,010 $7,010
Total Cost Savings -$102 $47,285 $3,348 $3,040 $3,040 $3,040 $3,040 -$5,870
Net Present Value: $6,144




Other Factors to be Considered 
 
First, the U.S. Army estimates that they will save $260 million over 20 years by closing 
the Army Garrison at Selfridge.  In order to avoid encroachment issues that would 
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endanger operations, the Air Force will have to assume responsibility for the property at 
Selfridge garrison, and thus they will assume some of its overhead costs.  The Air Force 
analysis does not account for these potential costs.  Moreover, the costs will likely run 
much higher than the need to construct a new fence, as mentioned above.  Demolition 
costs may be required as well. 
 
Second, in preparing its cost analysis the Air Force used a very low discount rate 
schedule, which slowly increases from 1.4 percent in 2005 to 2.7 percent in 2025.  Using 
such a low discount rate places greater value on expected long-term cost savings than 
most analysts are willing to accept.  Twenty years is a very long time period in the 
rapidly changing environment of national defense.   It would have been prudent to 
introduce a risk factor during the later years of the forecast period.  Table 11 shows the 
impact of the project’s Net Present Value under different discount rates and risk 







& 3% Risk 
in last 5 
years
Air Force NPV -$166,712 -$160,971 -$145,953
Upjohn Institute NPV $6,144 $3,599 $10,537






The Air Force justifies the closing of W.K. Kellogg Air Guard State solely on its military 
value. 
 
The Air Force placed one squadron at Selfridge (62 – military value) 
because it is significantly higher in military value than Kellogg (122 – 
military value).  The Air Force retired the older F-16 from Selfridge and 
combined the two fighter units into one squadron at retain trained and 
skilled ANG Airmen from both locations. (Italics added) 
 
 
It is the finding of this report that the large difference in military value between Selfridge 
and Kellogg cannot be supported by the data gathered in the WIDGET process. 
 
Second, it is very likely that the Air Force’s expectation of retaining trained and skilled 
ANG Airmen, especially its current A-10 pilots based at Kellogg, will not hold true.  It is 
likely that more than 50 percent of the A-10 pilots will not following the aircraft to 
Selfridge.  This will require million of dollars in retraining dollars to be spent to ready 
Selfridge’s F-16 pilots for the relocated A-10 positions.  This will eliminate a mission 
ready squadron and activate a new squadron that will not be mission ready until its new 
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pilots receive the necessary retraining and log-in the required flying hours.  It could take 
up to five years before the A-10 squadron would reach 50 percent of level of mission 
readiness it has today, at a cost of more than $72 million to the Air Force. 
 
Finally, the Air Force seriously erred in its estimation that the closing of the W.K. 
Kellogg ANG would result in a cost savings of $166.8 million.  We estimate that closing 
W.K. Kellogg will cost the Air Force more than $6 million (NPV) over the next 20 years.   
 
In summary, the methodology used by the Air Force did not provide an accurate 
evaluation of the military value of the W.K. Kellogg Air Base nor did it adequately 
measure the cost of closing the facility.  In short, the Air Force’s recommendation to 




SOF      
CSAR Bomber tanker airlift CS2ISR UAV Space
Andrews 21 64.83 55.23 57.19 68 62.05 74.6 75.8 53.96
Atlantic city 61 50.22 41.94 39.38 23.51 45.55 41.04 67.55 55.53
Bangor 123 34.47 31.77 31.45 42.68 43.83 52.05 52.64 40.33
Barksdale 33 61.49 49.81 60.74 84.14 72.43 87.27 78.15 84.01
Barnes 97 42.02 35.5 29.69 39.35 37.75 46.06 61.49 23.61
Birmingham 63 39.24 42.46 41.19 57.3 50.93 60.7 57.58 33.63
Bradley 98 40.1 35.4 27.43 48.55 37.83 51.78 54.51 12.77
Buckley 64 49.82 37.52 30.16 62.71 54.62 68.94 71.28 84.96
Cannon 50 55.22 41.03 45.7 56.18 45.43 61.46 68.91 66.56
Capital 115 38.18 32.43 30.83 51.84 36.96 55.95 56.07 39.12
Carswell 53 51.01 39.87 41.01 57.81 50.57 67.4 64.57 11.21
Channel Island 96 47.27 37.68 40.56 56.85 41.92 67.65 58.21 44.22
Charlotte 33 38.49 40.12 46.03 63.42 70.45 58.36 56.07 15.25
Dane-Truax 122 37.22 30.35 26.74 50.41 38.59 53.83 54.4 35.14
Dannelly 60 50.66 46.01 47.39 44.06 49.46 46.99 65.21 36.54
Des Moines 137 32.35 29.46 26.79 53.07 33.54 58.26 59.73 33.18
Dobbins 71 40.33 34.84 44.89 54.14 51.35 58.07 70.03 18.05
Duluth 136 32.55 24.68 23.75 40.43 30.43 44.87 55.85 4.24
Dyess 20 58.96 53.14 56.7 78.56 65.95 85.14 72.37 79.98
Eielson 11 69.09 53.27 52.12 57.97 67.34 69.62 77.36 82.5
Ellington 80 45.39 41.22 33.67 50.71 51.65 62.34 68.78 19.75
Ellsworth 39 58.06 43.91 50.81 83.73 59.4 87.72 69.73 84.12
Elmendorf 51 58.35 51.21 44.49 56.87 51.6 66.24 72.76 82.31
Fairfield 17 60.32 45.83 52.78 77.09 64.22 85.25 74.12 79.8
Forbes Field 35 46.55 40.95 43.47 66.07 51.93 74.73 60.48 37.88
Fort Smith 110 38.63 42.12 35.67 55.12 42.58 58.75 66.4 77.76
Fort Wayne 130 34.49 79.17 25.12 52.43 48.09 57.57 54.87 35.89
Fresno 87 43.09 46.99 40.71 51.39 46.12 51.51 66.19 35
General Mitchell 86 33.55 59.38 25.93 54 41.98 56.4 51.32 10.87
Great Falls 117 37.85 62.23 25.48 55.65 35.51 60.79 57.35 36.64
Hector 125 36.11 27.74 25.57 46.78 30.78 54.39 56.74 38.37
Hill 14 68.02 54.44 58.73 88.93 58.83 93.97 79.39 70.93
Homestead 31 59.17 50.71 51.44 57.34 48.15 70.3 74.95 20.62
Hulman 119 37.45 29.48 28.72 51.48 38.63 55.94 59.1 35.22
Jacksonville 24 61.8 55.66 52.71 48.21 45.79 53.81 75.01 14.96
Joe Foss 112 38.59 30.7 27.41 55.36 39.59 62.64 62.15 39.59
Kellogg 122 37.6 30.52 27.47 50.93 39.22 62.74 63.36 53.29
Key Field 92 42.66 41.96 43.24 52.83 56.39 63.66 61.23 36.53
Kirtland 16 66.44 50.63 55.27 74.73 55.47 79.11 79.62 82.93
Kulis 110 40.76 41.92 26.28 36.28 38.93 45.79 57.67 42.62
MCI Scores













Appendix A - continued
Military 
Value Fighter
SOF      
CSAR Bomber tanker airlift CS2ISR UAV Space
47 55.79 45.78 44.03 58.3 47.44 67.2 63.92 37.23
Lambert St. Louis 127 35.93 30.36 29.78 51.61 32.04 55.1 51.04 10.88
Little Rock 17 60.78 53.81 55.78 79.98 63.25 86.18 78.75 82.99
Louisville 79 36.56 32.31 25.96 54.72 44.66 57.84 50.76 35.44
MacDill 36 75.6 61.04 61.87 65.67 60.12 75.34 87.68 45.34
March 16 64.84 54.41 58.79 77.38 59.86 81.72 80.41 37.22
Martin State 140 51.42 39.45 43.55 32.26 30.37 36.39 55.54 19.75
Maxwell 21 59.61 53.73 47.77 52.43 59.9 60.61 71.67 36.78
McConnell 15 56.47 45.17 56.28 77.69 54.65 81.48 74.09 51.76
McEntire 48 55.74 50.55 53.76 48.51 59.35 56.98 75.68 45.31
McGhee Tyson 74 37.24 35.93 37.15 55.32 48.32 64.42 56.22 53.26
Mountain Home 23 63.01 49.68 58.44 86.64 59.77 91.75 78.18 83.8
Nashville 104 41.1 35.61 35.06 54.26 39.77 60.09 55.89 12.69
Nellis 12 68.73 53.81 68.33 77.7 63.95 83.28 82.35 77.45
New Castle 120 44.4 34.12 36.34 41.41 36.96 43.48 53.6 11.26
New Orleans 49 45.54 43.96 35.59 47.42 41.65 54.47 68.17 36.9
Onizuka 124 3.72 2.92 3.46 3.31 3.09 3.94 2.29 21.43
Otis 88 42.83 34.97 28.25 43.12 38.95 57.17 64.68 63.83
Pease 105 40.83 33.89 27.84 50.62 46.65 57.86 55.73 47.03
Peoria 127 34.4 30.64 28.26 72.03 35.77 59 56.57 46.03
Phoenix 37 52.3 38.54 41.64 65.27 48.12 65.31 61.46 33.05
Portland 71 45.95 36.36 33.4 55.44 42.32 62.84 67.22 12.15
Quonset State 125 41.1 28.81 24.32 39.4 35.29 45.72 49.76 33.5
Reno 101 51.34 35.24 39.43 61.85 40.51 65.22 59.47 33.57
Richmond 49 55.34 51.8 51 45.32 42.64 51.81 68.08 13.74
Robins 18 59.13 61.64 66.62 75.6 63.89 82.86 86.43 77.9
Rosecrans 114 41.25 37.76 33.71 55.88 38.22 59.74 70.09 35.63
Savannah 77 57.8 49.54 49.22 47.07 45.1 55.75 67.27 38.52
Schenectady 117 33.59 27.74 27.35 34.42 37.72 34.25 49.44 37.17
Schriever 1 6.41 5.61 6.15 5.66 5.78 6.58 6.11 96.54
Scott 38 47.91 39.96 33.83 65.12 44.55 67.77 61.57 58.1
Selfridge 62 48.07 42.06 33.86 58.24 47.27 63.74 62.07 21.35
Seymour Johnson 25 83.24 71.86 78.41 71.7 78.03 80.64 93.59 56.51
Sioux Gateway 67 39.5 28.98 31 56.36 39.3 60.23 60.63 36.26
Springfield-Beckley 128 35.37 24.54 27.16 44.7 33.54 46.86 48.5 34.48
Tinker 4 58.47 42.61 60.4 84.08 68.62 89.52 73.31 33.51
Toledo 123 36.85 31.16 28.79 51.84 41.45 57.76 56.55 36.29
Tulsa 114 38.41 37.72 41.3 58.73 43.2 61.51 57.5 13.34
Vandenberg 2 46.05 43.54 43.19 54.38 44.16 58.32 71.94 90.49
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Understanding the BRAC Plan
The BRAC Process
BRAC Implementation







• BRAC Report Anatomy







− Describes overall BRAC selection process
− Unclassified version of Force Structure Plan
− Details DoD’s closure and realignment recommendations and 
justifications
• Volume II:
− Classified Force Structure Plan
• Volumes III – XII:
− Detailed description of analytical processes and 
recommendations of each DoD proponent Organization




• Secretary of Defense – Align Base structure with 
expected force structure over the next 20 years (By Law 
– PL101-510 – required to base recommendations on a 
20 year Force Structure Plan)
• Goals
− Transformation
− Eliminate excess physical capacity
− Rationalizing the base infrastructure with new Defense Strategy
− Maximize both war fighting capability and efficiency
− Examine opportunities for Joint Activities
Source for Stated BRAC Goals:
(Vol V para3.3.5 pg 52) This iterative process continued until a set of 
candidate recommendations was reached that best















− Determine Physical and Operational capacity of an 
installation
− Determine if “Surge” capabilities meet contingency 
needs (Note:  neither “surge” nor “contingency 
needs” are defined)
Capacity Analysis as described by DoD BRAC report:
Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (pg17, 3rd Para under Analytical Framework) – Surge 
Capability Assessment:
As part of the assessment of probable threats to national security, the National Defense 
Authorization Act for 2004 requires the Department to “determine the potential, prudent, [sic] 
surge requirements to meet those threats.” The Military Departments and JCSGs
incorporated surge assessments in multiple steps of their analyses. Each determined the 
surge capacities needed to support the Department’s force structure plan, evaluated the 
capability of assigned installations and facilities to surge, and incorporated these capabilities 
in their capacity assessments. During the military value analysis, analytical proponents 
evaluated infrastructure supporting their functions within the framework provided by the 
BRAC selection criteria.  Criteria 1, “current and future” mission capabilities, and 
criteria 3, “ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total 
force requirements,” capture the concept of surge. By appropriately weighting criteria 
attributes and metrics, Military Departments and JCSGs ensured that surge was 




− Primary Area utilized for determining 
reapportionment
− Criteria 1 – 4
• Current and Future Missions
• Condition of Infrastructure
• Contingency, Mobilization, Future Forces
• Cost of Ops / Manpower
− Quantitative and Qualitative Components
Source:  Vol I Part 1 DoD BRAC Report
As required by statute, the military value of an installation or activity was the primary 
consideration in developing the Department’s recommendations for base realignments and 
closures. (Pg 21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)
Quantitative:  The quantitative component, explained in greater detail below, assigns 
attributes, metrics, and weights to the selection criteria to arrive at a relative scoring of 
facilities within assigned functions. (WIDGET) (Pg 21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)
Qualitative: The exercise of military judgment and experience to ensure rational application 
of the criteria. This component is discussed further in the context of scenario analysis. (Pg 
21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)
Comparative Analysis – Focus Areas:
1.  Coast Savings
2.  Joint Basing
3.  Surge Capabilities




− Following completion of Capacity and Military Value analysis
− Iterative process to identify potential closure/realignment 
scenarios
− JCSG developed scenarios (created outside the numerical 
process, subjective?)
• Scenario Analysis
− Evaluated against selection criteria 5 – 8 with a review of 
Military Value (Criteria 1 – 4)
− Decision Makers applied military judgment and experience to 
Military value of a proposal
Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (Pg 15, Joint Cross-Service Groups, para 1)
Important:  note the ability of the JCSG and Decision Makers to work outside the “objective” process. To 
facilitate a robust joint analysis during BRAC 2005, the Secretary of Defense chartered seven joint 
cross-service groups (JCSGs) to make realignment and closure recommendations related to common 
business-oriented support functions. The JCSGs, each of which had representatives from the Military 
Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff, were chartered as analytical 
proponents with exclusive authority to make recommendations related to assigned support functions. 
Each performed a broad, comprehensive review of these functions. The final BRAC 2005 package 
illustrates that these JCSGs generated a significant portion of the overall recommendations.
Source: Vol V para 3.3.5 (pg 52) 
The initial force structure deployment was refined by the BCEG in subsequent iterations to remove 
unrealistic or impracticable actions that the Cueing Tool was unable to recognize, actions that did not 
improve military value in the aggregate, or that were not supported by compelling military rationale. 
These subsequent iterations, termed second look, third look, and so on, were refined until a set of 
potential force structure deployments was reached that conformed to the Air Force principles, did 
not violate any Air Force imperatives, improved military capability and efficiency and was 
consistent with sound military judgment.
Source:  DoD Vol I Ch3 (pg 22) 
“Scenario Analysis” - Decision makers also applied their military judgment and experience to assess 
the overall military value of the proposal. Once the decision makers determined that the scenario was 
consistent with or enhanced military value, they proceeded to evaluate the scenario against the 
remaining selection criteria DoD Vol I Ch3 (pg 21)Qualitative Aspect of Military Value:  The qualitative 





− Determine Payback (Criterion 5)
• COBRA applied
− Determine Economic Impact (Criterion 6)
• Economic Impact Tool (EIT):  measures total potential job 
change (direct and indirect) in the economic region or 
Region of Influence
− Assessing Community Infrastructure (Criterion 7)
• Ability to support incoming personnel
• Evaluation of 10 Attributes
Note:  no definitions offered for “economic region” or “Region of Influence”




3. Cost of Living
4. Education
5. Employment (rates?)
6. Housing (availability? Cost?)
7. Medical Care (“ “, “ “)





• Results Analysis (con’t)
− Environmental Impact (Criterion 8)
• Cost relative to potential environmental restoration, waste management 
and environmental compliance activities
• Environmental Resource Impact
− 10 Areas
− Note:  Costs associated with Environmental Restoration are not included in payback 
calculations





• Community Support Infrastructure
• Environmental Impact
Source:  Vol I Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (pg 24)




• Land use constraints/sensitive resource areas
• Marine mammals/marine resources/marine sanctuaries
• Noise






• Guiding Principles for Facilities and Land
− Act Expeditiously
− Fully utilize all appropriate means  to transfer property
− Rely on leverage market forces
− Collaborate effectively (with local community)
− Speak with One Voice (local community speaks singly on 
desires)
Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report Ch 4 (Pg 27, Implementation and Reuse, para 3+)
Guiding Principles
Out of its experience assisting communities during the implementation of previous BRAC rounds, the Department believes that the 
following principles will be particularly useful in the transition in communities supporting the Department’s mission:
• Act expeditiously whether closing or realigning. Relocating activities from installations designated for closure will, when feasible, 
be accelerated to facilitate the transfer of real property for community reuse. In the case of realignments, the
Department will pursue aggressive planning and scheduling of related facility improvements at the receiving location.
• Fully utilize all appropriate means to transfer property. Federal law provides the Department with an array of legal authorities, 
including public benefit transfers, economic development conveyances at cost and no cost, negotiated sale to state or local
government, conservation conveyances, and public sale, by which to transfer on closed or realigned installations. Recognizing that 
the variety of types of facilities available for civilian reuse and the unique circumstances of the surrounding communities does not
lend itself to a “one-size-fits-all-solution,” the Department will use this array of authorities in a way that considers individual 
circumstances.
Chapter 4: Implementation and Reuse 28
• Rely on and leverage market forces. After four rounds of BRAC, both the public and private sectors are aware of the range of 
opportunities available for property reuse. A broad spectrum of practitioners has gained experience in all phases of base closure and
redevelopment. This expertise should allow market forces to work effectively. Community redevelopment plans and military 
conveyance plans should be integrated to the extent practical and should take account of any anticipated demand for surplus military 
land and facilities. If installation growth is substantial, the Department will work with the surrounding community so that the public and 
private sectors can provide the services and facilities needed to accommodate new personnel and their families.
• Collaborate effectively. Experience suggests that collaboration is the linchpin to successful installation redevelopment. Only by 
collaborating with the local community can the Department close and transfer property in a timely manner and provide a
foundation for solid economic redevelopment. While BRAC sometimes challenges the existing supportive partnership between the 
installation and the community, both parties can benefit from the change if they continue to recognize themselves as partners whose
individual interests in carrying out BRAC decisions are interrelated. Existing partnerships may need to expand to include state officials 
because of their environmental, historic preservation, and economic development responsibilities. Military-community
partnerships need to be flexible enough to adapt to the specific market forces and other circumstances at each location.
• Speak with one voice. The Department, executing disposal and reuse activities through the Military Departments and Defense 
Agencies, will provide clear and timely information through single focal points and will encourage affected communities to do
the same. Timely information regarding facility and environmental conditions and closure and realignment schedules are critically 
important. In the past, when communities spoke with one voice about their reuse goals and activities, the Department
was better positioned to consider local redevelopment plans. This was also true when installations and communities experienced 
substantial personnel increases. The Department recognizes that installation base commanders and local officials need to





− Priority Placement Program (PPP)
− Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (VERA)
− Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (VSI)
− Homeowners Assistance Program
− US Dept of Labor Funding
− JFTR Authorizations – Dislocation Allowance
Source: DoD Vol I Part 1 BRAC Report (pg 29)
Assistance for Personnel
One of the Department’s challenges at installations subject to BRAC decisions is the fair and
effective management of human resources. The closure of installations with the potential for
separating a large number of civilian employees presents major challenges to commanders and
human resource personnel. While these installations will still have missions to accomplish, the
employees will be stressed about their careers and employment security. In this atmosphere,
productivity will suffer and the employees’ overall quality of life may diminish. The
Department has a number of mitigating placement, transition, and worker assistance programs to
draw from, including the following:
• The Priority Placement Program provides for the referral and mandatory placement of
displaced employees who are qualified for other vacancies within the Department. Other
programs provide various types of referral and priority considerations for Defense and
other Federal agencies’ job vacancies.
• The Department’s permanent Voluntary Early Retirement Authority allows eligible
employees to retire early and receive a reduced annuity.
• The Voluntary Separation Incentive Program (with a cash payment) authorizes the
Department to encourage displaced employees to separate voluntarily by resignation or
retirement to avoid an involuntary separation of another employee.
• The Department’s Homeowners Assistance Program provides financial assistance to
relocating military and DoD civilians when they must sell their homes in a market that
has been adversely impacted by a BRAC action.
• The U.S. Department of Labor provides funding for assistance to displaced Federal
employees. Under the Workforce Investment Act, assistance may include counseling,
testing, placement assistance, retraining, and other related services. This assistance is
available through the appropriate state employment security agencies.
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The DATA – Terms Defined
• Military Value
− Criteria 1 – 4 (WIDGET):  Generate Bulk of Military Value Score
• Current and Future Missions (46%)
• Infrastructure Availability and Condition (41.5%)
• Contingency, Mobilization, Surge and Future Force Requirements (10%)
• Cost of Operations and Manpower (2.5%)









Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (Pg 18, BRAC 2005 Selection Criteria, para 2 / Pg D-35, Section 2913 
Selection Criteria for 2005 Round, para b)
(b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA.— The military value criteria are as follows:
(1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness o the total force of the 
Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
(2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for 
maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for 
the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
(3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both 
existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
(4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications.
Source: Vol 1 Part 1 DoD BRAC Report (Pg 21, Military Value Analysis, para 1)
Military Value Analysis (Criteria 1-4)
As required by statute, the military value of an installation or activity was the primary
consideration in developing the Department’s recommendations for base realignments and
closures. The Department determined that military value had two components: a quantitative
component and a qualitative component. The qualitative component is the exercise of military
judgment and experience to ensure rational application of the criteria. This component is
discussed further in the context of scenario analysis. The quantitative component, explained in
greater detail below, assigns attributes, metrics, and weights to the selection criteria to arrive at a
relative scoring of facilities within assigned functions.
To arrive at a quantitative military value score, the proponents began by identifying attributes, or
characteristics, for each criterion. The proponents then weighted attributes to reflect their
relative importance based upon things such as their military judgment or experience, the
Secretary of Defense’s transformational guidance, and BRAC principles. A set of metrics was
subsequently developed to measure these attributes (WIDGET). These were also weighted to reflect relative 
importance, again using, for example, military judgment, transformational guidance, and BRAC
principles. Once attributes had been identified and weighted, the proponent developed questions for use in 
military value data calls. If more than one question was required to assess a given metric, these were also 
weighted. Each analytical proponent prepared a scoring plan, and data call questions were forwarded to the field. 
These plans established how answers to data call questions were to be evaluated and scored. With the scoring 
plans in place, the Military Departments and JCSGs completed their military value data calls. These were then 
forwarded to the field by the Military Departments and Defense Agencies. The analytical proponents input the 
certified data responses into the scoring plans to arrive at a numerical score and a relative quantitative military 
value ranking of facilities/installations against their peers (COBRA).
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The DATA – Terms Defined
• Mission Capabilities Indices (MCI):
− Transmogrified Data for each Criteria 1 – 4
− Overall MCI rating for all bases
− “Objective” installation comparison for military value
− “BIG” is good
• Data Collection through WIDGET
− Weighted averages throughout
• Final Score for Military Value
− “Small” is good
− ??? To get from MCI score to MV score
− No table of comparison values between installations
Source: Vol I Part 2 DoD BRAC Report (Pg AF2, Military Value Analysis, para 1) & Vol V Part 1 DoD
BRAC Report AF (Pg 43, para 3.1.2)
Military Value Analysis
The Service assessed the military value of its operational bases using certified data derived from
individual installations. Rather than focus on fungible attributes like assigned personnel or
relocatable equipment and forces, the military value assessment stressed installation
characteristics that were either immutable or outside the control of the Air Force or were difficult
to replicate elsewhere due to expense or complexity. Immutable characteristics include
geographic location and proximity to other physical features or defense activities, terrain, and
prevailing weather. Difficult-to-reconstitute characteristics include the installation’s
transportation infrastructure, missile silos, or basic airfield infrastructure.
Applying operational capability data collected through a web-based installation 
data gathering and entry tool to BRAC Selection Criteria 1-4 and the weighing guidance 
assigned by the BCEG, each of the Air Force’s 154 installations was given a Mission Capability 
Index (MCI). For a given installation, there was a separate MCI for each of the eight mission 
areas (fighter, bomber, tanker, airlift, special operation / combat search and rescue, intelligence 
/ surveillance / reconnaissance, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space control).
Ultimately, using these data to assess all Active and Reserve Component installations on an
equal basis, all installations were rank ordered on their relative ability to support the eight Air
Force missions. The objective was to find an optimal long-term basing plan that, within physical
and operational constraints, located the Air Force’s long-term force structure at installations with
the highest military value.
tr.v. trans·mog·ri·fied, trans·mog·ri·fy·ing, trans·mog·ri·fies 








DoD Vol I, Cover Letter, bottom of 1st to 2nd page.
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Comparative Analysis: Transformation
• Definition: a process by which the Air Force 
achieves and maintains advantage through 
changes in Operational Concepts, Organizations 
and/or Technologies that significantly improve 
its war fighting capabilities or ability to meet the 
demands of a changing security environment
• Take-Away
− Ability to accept new missions is important
− Rating “HI” in more missions should be better than 
just one.
Source:  AF Transformation WEB
18
Comparative Analysis: Transformation
• Battle Creek scored better than the 4 of 5 other 
ANG A-10 bases on 5 of 8 missions
• Battle Creek’s overall MCI was better than 4 out 
of the 5 other ANG A-10 bases
• Bottom Line:  Looking at Future Capability, BC 
better suited for more missions than 4 of the 
other 5 ANG A-10 bases.
Note:  The comparative analysis was done utilizing the AF data which is 
flawed (see BRAC process concerns later in brief)
Source: Dept of the Air Force, Analysis and Recommendations – Vol V Part 
1 (pg 61, 67, 73, 79, 85, 91, 97, 103)
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Comparative Analysis: Transformation































































































































































































Overall MCI by Mission Area
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Comparative Analysis: Transformation
Average of 8 Mission Areas  by Criteria
C
urrent and Future M
sns, 44.93
C
urrent and Future M
sns, 60.70
C
urrent and Future M
sns, 41.41
C
urrent and Future M
sns, 52.30
C
urrent and Future M
sns, 47.73
C
urrent and Future M
sns, 46.43
C
urrent and Future M
sns, 44.78
C
ondition of Infrastructure, 35.57
C
ondition of Infrastructure, 50.45
C
ondition of Infrastructure, 38.07
C
ondition of Infrastructure, 27.64
C
ondition of Infrastructure, 42.24
C
ondition of Infrastructure, 39.20
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Overall MCI ScoreCost of ManpowerConting/Mob/Future Forces
Condition of 
Infrastructure
Current and Future 
MsnsBASE
Criteria 1 - 4 Averages Across 8 Mission Areas
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions
• Current Mission:  Combat Proven Superior Performing A-10 Fighter 
Wing
− Only ANG A-10 unit to Receive an “OUTSTANDING” rating on an Air 
Combat Command (ACC) Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) in the last 9 
years.
− 1 of 3 ANG Fighter Units to Support 3 Combat Operations in the Last 8 Years
− Only ANG unit to Deploy to Operation Southern Watch – return home –
within 3 weeks return to Southwest Asia for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) –
Deployed twice the personnel and equipment
− 466 Combat Sorties and over 1164 Combat hrs flown in support of OIF by 
110th A-10s
− Unit Volunteered and was Selected to Deploy into Iraq (Tallil Airfield) within 1 
week of initiation hostilities in OIF
− 110 FW has supported 39 Deployments with over 3,000 personnel and nearly 
1000 short tons of cargo in the last 10 yrs
*OIF – ANG/AFRC A-10s comprised the bulk of the deployed A-10s.  Of 6 deployed A-10 units, 5 
were ARC aircraft.
**If OEF is included, 6 of 7 deployed A-10 units were ANG/AFRC during the time of “major 
combat operations” in OIF (Mar-Apr 2003)
Combat Operations – Last 10 Years
1995 – Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia)
1997 – Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia)
1999 – Operation Noble Anvil (Kosovo)
2000 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
2002 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
2002 – Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
2003 – Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)
A number of folks (mostly transportation, chaplains and security)  have been activated to support 
on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, since “major” combat ended.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions
• Current Readiness = Future Mission Capability
• COMBAT Experienced Force
− From OIF: 14 Distinguished Flying Crosses and 10 Bronze Stars
− Avg A-10 Time per Pilot (Full Time) = 2340hrs
− Avg Combat Time per Pilot (Full Time) = 191hrs
− Avg Pilot has served a minimum of 2 Combat Tours
• Highly Qualified Pilot Force
− Special Qualifications: Flight Leads – 93%; Instructors 55%; 
Forward Air Controllers – 86%; Night Vision Goggle – 100%; 
Joint Air Attack Team – 69%; Targeting POD – 80%; Combat 
Search and Rescue – 79% Combat Experience – 80%
Source:  110 FW Flight records & 110 OG Stan/Eval (Letter of “X”)
Total A-10 Hrs Total Time Combat Hours
Total hrs all pilots 52381.4 78606.5 5054.5
Averages Hours All Pilots 1689.72 2535.69 163.05
Total Part-Time Hours 25795.6 44975.9 2950.2
Average Part-Time Hours 1289.78 2248.80 147.51
Total Full Time Hours 25735.5 33630.6 2104.3
Average Full-Time Hours 2339.59 3057.33 191.30
Special Qual Number with Qual Percentage
2-Ship Flt Lead 27 93.10%







LASDT 300' 27 93.10%
ACM ATTKR 26 89.66%
BARON 20 68.97%
LT POD 23 79.31%
NVG T/O + LND 13 44.83%
Combat Experience 23 79.31%
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions
• Only ANG A-10 Unit with 0 Class A or B Mishaps since 1995
• Current Readiness = Future Mission Capability
− Top Average “Fully Mission Capable” (FMC) Rate for A-10 
aircraft out of all ANG A-10 Units for last 10 yrs
− 110th A-10 Fleet has flown more hours than any other ANG A-10 unit 
over the last 8 yrs
− Most Combat Hours for any ANG A-10 unit during OIF
− Maintenance Personnel 1,039 yrs combined A-10 experience - 11yrs 
Avg for each Maintainer
− Full Partner in Total Force: 110 FW has fulfilled ALL Air 
Expeditionary Force (AEF) and Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS)
Taskings levied – 0 Shortfalls
− ECS Support of Operations Allied Force, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom
Source:  AF Safety Center Mishap Records
Safety:  10 Class A or B mishap in ANG A-10 units since 1995, Cost = approx $31.9 million
Source: 103 FW/MXOOA/MXQ, 104 FW/MXOOA/MXQ, 110 FW/MXOOA/MXQ, 111 FW/MXOOA/MXQ, 124 
FW/MXOOA/MXQ, 175 FW/MXOOA/MXQ, ANG











Mission Capable Rate Average (Last 5 years)
110th 75.7%







Reserves fly comparable hours to the A10 Guard Fleet.
Active Duty A10 Units do not send us their stats but from Air Force Periodicals their MC rates are generally in the 
50% range, as printed in these AF publications.
As far as Combat Sorties/Hours March 2003 the 110th flew 466 sorties and 1,164.2 hours
Source:  110 FW Personnel and Training Records
Our A-10 Technicians/Specialists average over 11 years of experience on the A-10, some have 20 years 
Weapons 11.6 years average 209 total years 18 workers
Crew Chiefs 12 years 218 years 18 workers
Avionics 10.7 years 204 years 19 workers
Propulsion 12 years 170 years 14 wokers
Accessories 10.1 years 172 years 17 workers
Sheet metal 11 years 66 years 6 workers
1039 years experience by 92 Specialists
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions























































110 FW Manning:  Assigned 1096, Full Time Federal (GS or AGR) 206 AGR / 66 
AGR, 824 Traditional
Manning Levels





Battle Creek 74.652 101.90%
Willow Grove 2273.372 100.90%
Selfridge 1505.252 97.80%
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions




















Green: Less than or equal to 2% of annual target => 
96.7%    22
Yellow:                                                         
94.7-96.6%     8
Red: Greater than or equal to 2% of annual target 















Battle Creek 74.652 101.90%
Willow Grove 2273.372 100.90%
Selfridge 1505.252 97.80%
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value




− Israel – Civil Engineers
− Honduras - Medical
• Homeland Defense / Homeland Security
− Operation Vigilant State
− On-Going support of MI State Police
− Alternate Command Facility for Federal Center
Source:  110 FW/XP Deployment records
Source:  MI NG/HQ Operation Vigilant State AAR
Operation Vigilant State:
1. An Exercise conducted in combination with MI Dept of HMS, FBI, 
BATFE, Dept of Military and Veterans Affairs (Air & Army Guard), Coast 
Guard, Federal Air Marshals, FAA, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
Transportation and Security Administration, MI State Police, Wayne 
County Airport Authority, Local Law Enforcement
2. Reaction to and Suppression of a potential MANPAD threat targeted 
against the Detroit Metropolitan Airport.
3. Exercise occurred from 9 – 12 May 2005.
4. After action report available upon request.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 1 – Current and Future Missions
Battle Creek – Ft Custer Joint Facility
6.25 NM
4 NM
7500 Acres of Federal Land Available for Growth
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30 NM Radius Around Fort Custer
Battle Creek
USAR
- TC CO Medium Truck Plus
ARNG (Custer)
- Det 1 1461 TRNS (CBT HET)
- FORT CUSTER TRNG SITE CMD
- 126 Press Camp HQ
- Det 4 Reg Trng Institute
- SVC BTRY 1 BN 119 FW (155SP)
- MI ARNG REG TNG SITE – MAINT
- 2ND BN 177TH REGT (GS)
- HQ 177 MP BDE
- Youth Challenge
- 51 CST (WMD)





- CO A 156 Signal BT CORP SPT-MSE
- CO C 156 Signal BT CORP SPT-MSE
USAR
- Det 1 (CO A/B)
- MP CO Det 1
- IN RGT 02 CO A (OSUT)
- MC DET (Logistics Spt)
- CA BN DET (Gen Spt)
- CA BN HHD (Gen Purpose)
- CA BN General Purpose
- CA BN Det (Direct Support)
- CA BN (General Purpose)









- Bridge CO A, 6th Engr 
Spt BA, 4th FSSG
- Det 1, HQ & Service CO, 
6th Engr Spt BA, 4th FSSG
- Engr Spt CO, 6th 





- 63d Troop Command
- HQ 107 S&S Battalion
- HQ DET 1 STARC
- DET 1 1463 TRANS CO
Charlotte
ARNG
- 119 FA BN 01 BTRY C REAR
- HQ 107 S&S Battalion
- HQ Det 1 STARC
DoD Joint Integration Board






Number of Units within 30 miles:  Approximately 40
Number of Personnel:  Over 4000
Number of Congressional Districts: 2
Total Economic Impact:  Est. Over $200,000,000
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30 NM Radius Around Fort Custer
Battle Creek
USAR
- TC CO Medium Truck Plus
ARNG (Custer)
- Det 1 1461 TRNS (CBT HET)
- FORT CUSTER TRNG SITE CMD
- 126 Press Camp HQ
- Det 4 Reg Trng Institute
- SVC BTRY 1 BN 119 FW (155SP)
- MI ARNG REG TNG SITE – MAINT
- 2ND BN 177TH REGT (GS)
- HQ 177 MP BDE
- Youth Challenge
- 51 CST (WMD)





- CO A 156 Signal BT CORP SPT-MSE
- CO C 156 Signal BT CORP SPT-MSE
USAR
- Det 1 (CO A/B)
- MP CO Det 1
- IN RGT 02 CO A (OSUT)
- MC DET (Logistics Spt)
- CA BN DET (Gen Spt)
- CA BN HHD (Gen Purpose)
- CA BN General Purpose
- CA BN Det (Direct Support)
- CA BN (General Purpose)









- Bridge CO A, 6th Engr 
Spt BA, 4th FSSG
- Det 1, HQ & Service CO, 
6th Engr Spt BA, 4th FSSG
- Engr Spt CO, 6th 





- 63d Troop Command
- HQ 107 S&S Battalion
- HQ DET 1 STARC
- DET 1 1463 TRANS CO
Charlotte
ARNG
- 119 FA BN 01 BTRY C REAR
- HQ 107 S&S Battalion
- HQ Det 1 STARC
DoD Joint Integration Board
Highlighted Units Indicate those units Battle Creek ANGB directly supports 
or operates Jointly with on a regular basis.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
• 16yr Average Age of Facilities
− 80% Built after 1991 – focused on A-10 mission
• No Encroachment Challenges
• 10,000’ Runway – Alternate Shuttle Landing Site, Utilized by Air 
Force One
• Largest Most Modern Munitions Storage Facility in Southwest MI
• Room for Growth
− Over 41,000 sq ft available in authorized square footage for new
facilities
− Over 45 acres available for building
• New Control Tower
• Planned Parallel Runway to Facilitate Larger Fighter Presence
• Facility can support 36 A-10’s TODAY, without modification
Source:  110 FW Real Property Records, W.K. Kellogg Airfield Management
Auth Space = 373,680 sq ft
Actual Space = 332,377
Space Shortage = 41,303 (89%)
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure - Proposed New Rwy
Source:  W.K. Kellogg Planning Commission (Airfield Management)
Proposed New parallel RWY and supporting taxiways
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Source:  110 FW Real Property Records, 110 FW Land Use Plan
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
• Prime Training Location
− Access to 3 Air-to-Surface Ranges – 2 Allow LIVE 
weapons within 200nm (Including Laser Guided 
Munitions – very rare due to munition footprint)
− Access to 6 Military Operating Areas (MOA) within 
200nm
− 2 Army Maneuver Areas within 200nm
• Allows for large numbers of aircraft training 
simultaneously
• Ideal Location for Increased Operations
DoD FLIP Publications, Applicable Range Regulations
Air-to-Surface Ranges:
Range Sq Miles Airspace Live Drop Dist From BC (NM)
R-4201 Grayling Range 70 Surf – 23,000 Yes (LGB) 150
R-3401 Atterbury Range 81 Surf – 25,000 No (Inert Only) 175
R-3403 Jefferson Range 90 Surf – 24,000 Yes (LGB) 193
Military Operating Areas
Hersey 660 5,000 – 23,000 Dry Only 70
12 Mile 264 500’ – 10,000 Dry Only 90
Hilltop 1120 10,000 – 34,000 Dry Only 94
Steelhead 3240 6,000 – 18,000 (ATCAA 50,000) 110
Pike(E/W) 10144 6,000 – 18,000 (ATCAA 50,000) 137
Buckeye 2040 5,000 – 18,000 191
AR-107 Air Refueling Track N/A 14,000 – 23,000 86
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Battle Creek Ranges & Airspace
200nm Range from BC – Range chosen based on normal sortie duration 
(1.5 – 2.0hrs)  with 45 – 60 minutes of range time available for training.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Selfridge Ranges & Airspace (Lose 2 Air-Ground Ranges)
Compared to BC
1. Loss of 2 Air-to-Ground Ranges, including 1 with Live Munition and LGB 
capability
2. Place 2 MOAs at Max training range, limiting low altitude training –
navigation of Detroit Airspace, to/from MOAs
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure -Willow Grove 
Ranges & Airspace (Significant Reduction in Availability)
Notes:
1.Ft Drum complex – primary range – greater than 200nm from WG
2.MOA airspace extremely limited – only MOA within 200nm limited to 8,000 
– 17,999
3.Whiskey areas available off coast – extremely limited use to A-10 aircraft
4.Navigation of complex east coast airspace – Washington / New York / 
Boston
5.Range Encroachment – Warren Grove – Accidental 20mm Firing hits 
school (Nov 2004), 2002 F-16 on Range – Engine Failure – Pilot Ejects – Jet 
lands on Garden State Pkwy
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure –Barnes/Bradley 
Ranges & Airspace (Significant Reduction in Availability)
Note:
1. Congested East Coast Airspace
2. Long Distance to Air-to-Surface ranges through congested airspace
3.Range Encroachment – Warren Grove – Accidental 20mm Firing hits 
school (Nov 2004), 2002 F-16 on Range – Engine Failure – Pilot Ejects –
Jet lands on Garden State Pkwy
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Battle Creek Ranges & Airspace HUB+SPOKE!
Stark comparison to other airfields.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
• Selfridge Facilities
− MCI scores based on facilities not available post 
BRAC
− Average age of remaining facilities: 51yrs (BC = 
16yrs)
− Lost Square Footage: 244,017 sq.ft.
− Primary Hangar Space Built in 1932 and 1955 (1960 
and 2005 @ Battle Creek)
− MCI score difference:  
• Selfridge: Max Points = 3.88
• Battle Creek = 1.94
Note:  Hangar Space is referenced in formula 1221 (Fighter MCI)
Source: 110 FW & 127 WG Real Property Records, BRAC CE assessment (Facilities to be lost), Dept of the AF BRAC 
Analysis and Recommendations Vol V Parts 1 & 2.
Available Hangar Space Comparison (sq ft):
Battle Creek Selfridge Difference
Building Size Year Built Building Size Year Built
6900 26,118 1960 36 62,983 1955 36,865
6901 12,551 2005 3 26,880 1932 14,329
6917 17,096 1988 154 17,000 1991 -17,096
34,098
Note:  Bld 154 square footage not included as the facility cannot support A-10 aircraft (too short) and will require 
significant modification to accommodate new mission.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
• Selfridge Facilities
− Required Renovations:
• Fuel Cell:  Not Large enough for A-10, Cost ?
• Hangars:  89,863 sqft of 1932/55 vintage Hangar space
• Cost to Renovate:  $14,229,806
− Other Possible Renovations:
• Facilities Built in 1932 = 100,668 sqft total
• Cost to renovate = $15,940,777
• Closure of the Army Garrison
− Additional Security costs?
− Additional Encroachment Challenges
Source:  Recent remodel of W.K. Kellogg Hanger completed in March of 
2005 (20,208 sq ft) $3.2 million.  $158.35 per sqft for renovation of hangars
Seldridge Facilities (Real property records):
Bld Year Built Size (sq ft) Cost to Renovate
154 1991 17,000 ? (Not Large enough for A-10)
5 1932 33,535 $5,310,267
7 1932 32,890 $5,208,131
9 1932 34,243 $5,422,379
Total 100,668 $15,940,777 (Bld 154 not included)
Source:  Army Garrison Closure, Vol I Part 2 DoD BRAC Report (pg Army-106)
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Source: AF BRAC IVT
46
• CODE 1 (Useable – Class A, Adequate)
A facility, which can be used to house the function for which currently designated through end position 
use with reasonable maintenance and without major alteration or reconstruction.
• CODE 2 (Useable – Class B, Substandard)
Upgrading Required and Practical: A facility which is structurally sound, and which is inherently capable 
of being raised to Usable--Class A standards for housing function for which currently designated by 
reasonable and practical expenditure of funds
• CODE 3 (Force Use – Substandard)
A facility that cannot practically be raised to meet Usable--Class A standards for housing function for 
which currently designated, but which, because of necessity must be continued in use for a short duration 
or until a suitable facility can be obtained.
• CODE 4 (Sterile)
A facility which (a) does not meet the condition classification codes 1, 2, 3, or 5; (b) is excess to mission 
requirement in designed, changed, or converted use and is not-- due to economic considerations--
considered appropriate for disposal.
• CODE 5 (Facilities Committed to Congress)
Identifies all facilities committed to Congress for disposal. This code will not be changed unless HQ 
USAF approves permanent retention.  Programmed for demolition.
• CODE 6 (Disposal Approved by All Levels of the Air Force)
Identifies all facilities approved for disposal within the AF other than those in condition 5.  Approved for 
Demolition.
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – ANG A-10 Facility Comparison
Source:  Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Real Estate Business Practices Manual, Sixth 
Edition, July 2004 (PP I.201 – I.202)
47
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
















Source:  ANG A-10 Base Real Property Records
48
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
























Source:  ANG A-10 Base Real Property Records
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value













before 1994CAT 5/6CAT 3CAT 2CAT 1BASE
Source:  ANG A-10 Base Real Property Records
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure




AF Study to see where accidents occur in relation to airport
Conducted in 1973 and updated in 1995
Results found:
61% of accidents related to landing operations
30% of accidents related to takeoff operations
80% were fighter or training aircraft
CLEAR ZONE
Adjacent to end of runway
3000’ X 3000’
27.4 % of all Air Force Accidents
ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE I (APZ I)
Adjacent to Clear Zone
3000’ X 5000’
10.1 % of all Air Force Accidents
ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE II
Adjacent to APZ I
3000’ x 7000’
5.6 % of all Air Force Accidents
CLEAR ZONE USE PROHIBITED
For anything that produces light emissions
For anything that unnecessarily attracts birds or waterfowl
Generally acquires the land through purchase or easement to prevent development
ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE I (APZ I)
Less critical but still possesses significant hazards
Allows industrial/manufacturing, transportation, communications/utilities, whole sale trade, open space, recreation 
and agriculture
ACCIDENT POTENTIAL ZONE II
Less critical but still possesses significant hazards
Same uses as APZ I
as well as low density single family residential
personal and business services 
commercial/retail trade uses of low intensity or scale of operations. 
High people density should be limited to the maximum extent possible
Optimum density recommended for residential usage is one dwelling per acre
51
Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure






Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Martin State
Housing in clear zones
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Martin State
Housing in clear zones – increased since photo taken
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Willow Grove
Congested location – proximity to large metropolitan area
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Willow Grove
8000’
Heavily populated in close proximity to Airfield
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Willow Grove
Dense population in clear zones
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Willow Grove
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Selfridge
Congested location – proximity to large metropolitan area and Canada
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Selfridge
9000’
AF was forced to purchase 2,562 acres off the southern end of RWY 01/19 
($720,563) to limit current encroachment problems.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Selfridge
Dense population
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
Encroachment Challenges – Selfridge
HOUSING
Housing continues to be built in clear zones, additional land purchase by AF 
may be required to avoid further encroachment
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
No Encroachment Challenges – Battle Creek
“Middle of nowhere” but convenient to metropolitan areas for HMD/HMS 
missions.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
No Encroachment Challenges – Battle Creek
10,000’
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
No Encroachment Challenges – Battle Creek
0 housing in clear zone
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 2 – Condition of Infrastructure
No Encroachment Challenges – Battle Creek
O housing in clear zones and majority of airfield is surrounded by farm land 
and Ft Custer
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 3 – Contingency, Mobilization & Future Forces
• Supporting 39 AF Deployments with over 3,000 personnel, 
nearly 1000 short tons of cargo in the last 10 yrs
• OIF – ANG/AFRC A-10s comprised the bulk of the 
deployed A-10s.  Of 6 deployed A-10 units, 5 were ARC 
aircraft.
• Combat Operations – Last 10 Years
− 1995 – Operation Deny Flight (Bosnia)
− 1997 – Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia)
− 1999 – Operation Noble Anvil (Kosovo)
− 2000 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
− 2002 – Operation Southern Watch (Iraq)
− 2002 – Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)
− 2003 – Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)
Source:  110 FW/XP, AF/XP
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 3 – Contingency, Mobilization & Future 
Forces
• Joint Operations & Capabilities
− Since 2002, 110 FW provided deployment support for multiple 
Non-AF Units – 10 deployments, 1076 PAX & 245 short tons 
cargo
− Primary Deployment center for 51st Civil Support Team –
Regional Disaster Response Team
• Joint Training Facility for ARNG, ANG, Marine and 
Navy Reserve utilizing Ft Custer – W.K. Kellogg 
Facilities
• Ideal Location for “Aeroport” Operations  - Deploying 
Aircraft, Personnel & Equipment throughout the Globe
Source:  110 FW/XP
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 3 – Contingency, Mobilization & Future 
Forces










Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower
• BRAC Report States 
− $8.3 Million one time cost to Close W.K. Kellogg
− Save $14.4 million annually during implementation 
period
− $167 million in savings over 20 years”
• The REAL Numbers – Over $16.9 million -




Areas Included to determine actual cost savings when closing BC:
1. Infrastructure Maintenance and Support
2. All other costs are transferred (see assumptions)
Areas included to determine cost to move unit:
1. Personnel retraining costs based on 50% new unit – current costs do not include MX (still researching)
2. Additional Annual Training and Drill Costs
3. Cost to move the “required” personnel (PCS)
4. Did not include costs to repair/upgrade facilities at new location (difficult to accurately quantify)
Assumptions:
1. ARC End Strength remains unchanged through FY11
DoD BRAC Report Vol I (pg11) End-strength (k)  & (GAO)-05-785
FY05 FY07 FY09 FY11
USAF AC 360 356 350 350
RC 183 182 182 183
2. 50% of the “Combined” unit will require complete retraining
3. Number of personnel commuting would not change, used actual numbers based on BC personnel
4. AFIs were utilized to the max extent possible to define “combat capable”, i.e. AFI 11-202 Vol I for pilots on 
training/hours required for upgrades 
5. Based on Current BRAC plan, there will be overlap between 110 FW and 127 FW personnel.
6. A-10 TX and B Course costs provided by ANG Training
7. ACC/DO provided flying hour costs = $3433 per hour for the A-10 (AF/FMC)
8. Retraining costs include cost of additional sorties to return squadron to previous quals, but does not include the 
extra IP sorties expended on the training (difficult to quantify as most will count towards IP training, but some will 
not)
9. Overall personnel operating costs do not change as the ARC end strength is unchanged
10. No savings on equipment as the new unit will require all the same equipment
11. No savings from closing the F-16 and C-130 unit at Selfridge should be attributable to the closure of BC
12. All training course can be accomplished when desired (i.e. no waiting for class dates)
Hidden Costs
• Loss of Readiness – Fighter Squadron, CST Support, Marine Support, HMD Support
• Removal of the Citizenry from the Military
• Family Costs
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower
• ACTUAL Cost to Operate W.K. Kellogg
− $650,000 Annually in facility operating and 
maintenance
− $0 property lease
− $0 personnel cost – TRANSFERRED
− $0 equipment cost – TRANSFERRED
− $57,000 Airfield support costs (snow removal, etc.)
− $4,217,411 Operations Maintenance Budget Savings 
(Note: some of these costs may transfer with 
personnel and equipment)
• Savings over 20 years = $84.35 million (no 
discount applied)
Source:  110 FW/FM Budget Records
Potentially Non-Transferred Operations and Maintenance Costs







Potential (Maximum) Savings $4,217,411
Over 20 years $84,348,220
Note: No discount rates applied to savings numbers – actual savings would 
be significantly less.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower
• The REAL cost of the closure and move
− FACILITIES – construction of new buildings, modification of existing 
facilities at new location as they do not accommodate the A-10 
Operations= $Unknown
• Selfridge Remaining Facilities Average Age > 51yrs
• Most Selfridge Maintenance Facilities built in 1932
• Note:  Many facilities included in BRAC analysis will be “moth balled” or 
demolished – inaccurate collection 
• New Simulator Building / Fire Station Upgrade / Fuel Cell Modifications
− PERSONNEL
• PCS Moves
− 206 GS Employees = $7,821,138
− 66 AGR Employees = $846,994
− TRAINING
• Increase in Annual Training (AT) and Drill Costs
− $1,023,276/yr ($20,465,520/20yr)
• Retraining Costs
Source:  Cost analysis basis derived from JFTR (Joint Federal Travel Regulation)
New Commuters Annual 
Training
Additional Per Diem Expense/day $             21 
600 @15 days/ year $     189,000 additional per diem for 15 AT days for 600 traditional guardsmen
Additional Mileage Expense
600 @ .37 @ 150 miles $      33,300 per AT day
600 @ 15 AT days $     499,500 for 15 AT days for 600 guardsmen
UTA
377 people Fri & Sat Nights $      27,898 *additional cost to cover new commuters outside 50 mile radius
12 UTA's $     334,776 Total cost for contract quarters
$  1,023,276 
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower
• TRAINING
− PILOT TX/B COURSES
• B Course $3.4 Million per pilot
• TX Course $990,000 per pilot
• 50% Unit Retraining:  Cost for 14 TX and 4 B Courses = $27,460,000
• 100% Unit Retraining: 32 TX and 4 B Courses = $45,280,000
− 5 Years A-10 Flying (IOC)
• 18 Pilots  =  $40,227,894
• 36 Pilots =  $80,455,788
− Additional Sorties over 5 Years to regain Qualifications (Based on 
Current Qual Levels)
• Flying Cost to regain Quals (18 pilots) = $4,322,137
• Flying Cost to regain Quals (36 pilots) = $6,962,982
− TOTAL Pilot Retraining (Over 5 Years)
• $72,010,031 to $132,698,770
Source:  AFI 11-2A/OA-10 Vol 1 (Cost per flying Hour AF/FMC)
All sortie counts are minimums:
18 Pilots
1 year to get experienced = 84 sorties/pilot
4 years training to regain all quals = 288 sorties/pilot
Avg sortie duration 1.75 hrs
372 sorties/pilot X 1.75 hrs = 651 hrs Avg time per pilot (**Compared to now – 1700hrs)
651hrs X 18 pilots X $3,433 per flight hour = $40,227,894
Experienced Aircrew (EXP)—For pilots: hours are FP/IP/MP and fighter time is defined as FP/IP/MP
hours logged in aircraft with an assigned an AFSC of 11FX. OA-10 is considered fighter time. An
experienced pilot has: 500 hrs PAI, or 1,000 hrs (FP/IP/MP), of which 300 are PAI, or 600 fighter hrs, of
which 200 hrs are PAI, or previously fighter EXPERIENCED and 100 hrs PAI.
Sorties to regain quals:
Retrain 18 pilots to Qual percentages Retrain 36 Pilots
# Pilots Sorties Hours Sorties Hours
16.8 167.6 293.28 270.0 472.5
13.0 65.2 114.05 105.0 183.75
9.9 99.3 173.79 160.0 280.00
15.5 77.6 135.78 125.0 218.75
18.0 72.0 126.00 116.0 203.00
12.4 12.4 21.72 20.0 35.00
14.9 89.4 156.41 144.0 252.00
8.7 8.7 15.21 14.0 24.50
16.8 33.5 58.66 54.0 94.50
16.1 16.1 28.24 26.0 45.50
12.4 12.4 21.72 20.0 35.00
14.3 57.1 99.93 92.0 161.00
8.1 8.1 14.12 13.0 22.75
Totals 719.4 1258.91 1159.0 2028.25
1259 hours X $3,433/hr = $4,322,137 $6,962,982
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower
• How Long Will the Retraining Take?
− TX Course – 4 Months
− B Course – 7 Months (PCS)
− Davis Monthan AFB can support 2 classes per year 
with 15 students Max
− Barksdale AFB can support 1 class per year (B 
Course) with 4 Students Max, TX course – 5 per year 
with 6 – 8 students Max
• How many slots will be available for ANG 
retraining?
Source:  Det 3 TRSS/OTD Davis Monthan AFB & 442 FW Barskdale AFB 
Training
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower
• Training – MX personnel
− Although an unlikely scenario – 100% full retraining 
of MX personnel would cost over $6.6 Million
− This cost is not included in the overall retraining 
totals; however, the cost is more than $0 as currently 
defined in COBRA
Supporting Data located in MX DATA Collection file.
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Comparative Analysis: Military Value
Criterion 4 – Cost of Operations & Manpower
• Bottom Line Cost Analysis
− Savings Over 20 years = $84.35 million
− Costs over 20 Years
• Personnel Movement = $8.7 million
• Retraining Costs = $72 million - $132.6 million
• Increased AT/Drill Cost = $20.5 million
− NET:
• Savings $84.35 Million
• Costs $101.2 Million - $161.8 Million
Bottom Line  $16.85  - $77.45 MILLION in Costs
Note:  Costs not included –
1.  Infrastructure
a.  Fire Station
b.  Sim Bld
2.  Retirements and other early out incentive 
programs (double bill)
3.  MX personnel retraining costs
76
BRAC Process – Concerns
• Data Gathering – Consistency
− Installations being credited with facilities not owned 
or slated for removal (Army Garrison)
− IVT (Installation Visualization Tool) – not utilized 
for all installations, yet “provided” tool for 
comparison?
• Data Gathering – Criteria (re: Fighter / SOF-CSAR Missions)
− Favoring Large Active Duty Locations
• Formulas 8, 1232, 1241,1214 and 1233
− Logical Concerns
• Formulas 8, 1245, 1246, 1266, 1270, 1271, 1241
Source:  Dept of the AF BRAC Recommendations and Analysis Vol V Part 1 (Pg 61-103) Vol V Part 2 (MCI Formulas)
Favoring AD Bases:
8 – Joint Civil-Military fields utilize shared ramp space (ANG units not authorized large ramps, i.e. BC is authorized 30,000 sq yds)
1232 – Sufficient Explosive sited parking
1241 – Ability to Support Large scale mobility deployment
1214 – Fuel dispensing rate to support mobility and Surge
1233 – Sufficient Munitions storage
•All of these areas are going to favor a large AD facility and put small Joint Civil-Military facilities at a disadvantage.
•Because of QD (safety) criteria – munitions storage on a Joint  Civil-Military facility is going to be limited regardless of facility capacity
•The questions did not take into account MOUs with civil partners to increase capability
•Further, they ignore the cost savings inherent by not maintaining these large facilities + equipment
Logical Concerns:
8 – BC not authorized 241,000 sq yds (Max points) yet graded against that criteria?  Not funded for 241,000 sq yds, BC has significant acreage 
available for increased ramp space if it was authorized
1245 – Proximity to airspace supporting mission *Arbitrary distances assigned without regard for mission accomplishment, i.e. is 150 miles too 
much or no effect
** See Airspace Slides – BC has more in quantity and quality of all types of training airspace **
1246 – Proximity to Low Level Routes Supporting Mission *Not required for most low altitude tactical training in Fighter Aircraft – dated 
requirement
1266 – Range Complex Supports mission *Again distance and mission impact is the criteria, further units were assigned “ownership” which is 
irrelevant
1270 – Suitable Aux Airfield within 50nm *Not relevant based on fighter fuel requirements and capabilities – not utilized in training
1271 – Prevailing installation weather conditions *3000/3 is arbitrary, further the question should be based on weather effecting  mission 
accomplishment.  Given a standard of 300/1 for most fighter aircraft, range weather is of more significance than home station weather. 
1241 – Ability to support large scale mobility deployment *Question did not intimate a “surge” requirement.  MOUs on Joint civil-military fields can 
drastically increase the capability of a small installation for the fraction of the cost of maintaining the facilities as DoD.  This was not asked.
Installation Visualization Tool (IVT)
IVT provides the BRAC 2005 process a means of viewing imagery and geospatial data a consistent fashion for all installations meeting BRAC 
2005 threshold criterion. BRAC policy memo number one (16 Apr 03, OSD/AT&L) identifies IVT as a tool to be used during the BRAC 2005 
process that will enhance the Department’s overall ability to manage its infrastructure. The BRAC Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG) developed 
requirements for us IVT. ***Required for Use, yet NONE of the ANG A-10 bases were scored utilizing this tool, further the Selfridge IVT 
was incomplete***
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BRAC Process – Concerns
31.3735.535.6644.191.943.883.88%Hangar Capability – Small Aircraft1221
51.81%Total % Effected
29.6728.6936.845.610.82.467.99%Airspace Attributes to DZ/LZ1249
30.4731.1535.1745.152.432.923.68%Airfield Elevation1243
32.934.0737.2947.310.310.761.96%Buildable Acres for Growth1205.2
33.2134.8337.644.7303.345.06%Prevailing Weather Conditions1271
33.2138.1737.3247.730.280.343.68%Proximity to Low Level Routes 1246

















SOF/CSAR MCI Formula Discrepancy Analysis
36.81%Total % Effected
33.3139.3837.2947.310.310.761.96%Buildable Acres for Growth1205.2
33.6240.1437.644.4303.645.52%Prevailing Weather Conditions1271
33.6243.7836.7547.20.850.877.25%Proximity to Low Level Routes 1246













Fighter MCI Formula Discrepancy Analysis
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BRAC Process – Concerns


































As scores are adjusted for Formula discrepancies and flaws – the difference 
in scores becomes statistically insignificant.
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As scores are adjusted for Formula discrepancies and flaws the installations 
actually reverse position.
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BRAC Process – Concerns
• DoD & AF Substantially Deviated from Stated BRAC 
Objectives and Goals
• Military Value
− “Final Scores” do not reflect MCI analysis or real life
− MCI process flawed in data gathering and analysis
− “Hard Data” runs contrary to AF conclusions
• Transformation
− Battle Creek better suited for more missions than 4 of the 5 other 
ANG A-10 bases
− W.K. Kellogg & 110 FW have much to offer within the AF 
Transformation Plan – Readiness, Facilities, Location = Capability
• Cost Savings
− NO SAVINGS for Air Force
− Conservative Estimates Show $16.9 - $77.5 Million in Costs
Military Value
1. One of the Top A-10/Fighter Units in the ANG, by performance – scored 
very poorly – doesn’t make sense
2. Installation designed for the A-10, scores poorly in its primary mission –
doesn’t make sense
Readiness
1. ANG A-10’s scheduled for AEF Cycle 6, AEFs 5 – 8 with 26 aircraft.  
Occurs during transfers, moves and closures.  Volunteerism?  These are 
not activations.
Citizen Soldier
1. What is the cost of keeping the public involved through the Citizen 
Soldier?
2. Over 800 positions will be terminated with the closure of the 110th
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Bottom Line:
What Do I Lose? What do I Gain?
• Lost:
− Top Combat Unit – Capability Does NOT Transfer
• Over 800 Fully Trained Deployable Combat Experienced Member of the ANG
• Pilots – One of the most Experienced and Decorated Units
• Maintenance – Highest FMC Rate for A-10
• Support – Unfailing World-Wide Expeditionary Combat Support
• COMBAT Capability for Half a Decade!
− Top Notch Facility – Designed for A-10 Operations
− Optimum Training Location
− Key Joint Deployment Location and Facility
− Leading Recruiting Base of ALL ANG A-10 Units and SW MI
− Military Connection to SW MI
• Gain:
− NOTHING (No Increase in Capability, Does not support Transformation, 
No Cost savings)
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WHAT’S LOST . . .
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Questions 
& Comments
